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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides prisoners protection from “cruel and unusual punishments.”1
Cruel and unusual punishment, a broad term, encompasses a variety
of actions taken by prison officials concerning inmates. In particular,
the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners”
has been established as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.2 In
September of 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts decided a case of first impression concerning the denial of
necessary medical treatment to an inmate.3 In this case, the pris-
oner requested sex reassignment surgery (SRS) to treat his4 gender
identity disorder (GID).5 For the first time, the court determined that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
3. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
4. In accordance with the decision made by most courts, this Note will use pronouns
matching parties’ biological gender, not the gender of identity.
5. Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
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the denial of SRS by prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.6
If upheld, this decision creates a dichotomy in the distribution
of medically necessary health care in the United States. Specifically,
those that rely on the government for their health care plans cannot
obtain SRS despite medical necessity due to the prohibitive cost of
the procedure absent insurance.7 These government funded health
care programs, including Medicaid, Medicare, and CHAMPUS (the
health care program for veterans, active duty service members, and
their families) explicitly prohibit, or have been held to prohibit SRS,
even in cases of medical necessity.8
Without legislative action, on both the state and federal levels,
however, this discrepancy will continue to exist. Unfortunately, cur-
rent precedent concerning the right of individuals to receive medi-
cally necessary treatment would result in a failure of both due process
and equal protection claims brought by patients requiring SRS. The
resulting regime provides SRS for criminals serving prison sen-
tences, and yet it leaves those reliant on public forms of health care
to suffer with GID without the medically necessary treatment.
First, Part I of this Note will define Gender Identity Disorder,
and describe how the medical community recommends it be treated.
It also will discuss the costs related to GID treatment, including
SRS. Part II will outline Eighth Amendment precedent concerning
the provision of medical care in order to establish the standard that
was utilized in Kosilek II. Part III will outline the precedent con-
cerning Eighth Amendment challenges brought by inmates suffering
from GID and requesting specific treatments. Part IV will explain
the decision in Kosilek II and demonstrate why, in some cases, prison
medical services must provide SRS for inmates. Part V will outline
the limits states have placed on beneficiaries of state health care pro-
grams with regards to obtaining SRS. Part VI will analyze the di-
chotomy and moral dilemma that result from the provision of SRS to
prisoners, but not beneficiaries of government health care programs.
Additionally, Part VI will analyze how constitutional challenges on
equal protection and due process grounds will not alleviate this dis-
crepancy. Rather, Congress and state legislatures must act to pro-
vide SRS in their health care plans to alleviate this moral dilemma.
6. Id. at 198.
7. Mary Ann Horton, The Cost of Transgender Health Benefits 2 (paper presented
at Out and Equal Workplace Summit, Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www.tgender
.net/taw/thb/THBCost-OE2008.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755,760 (8th Cir. 2001); Casillas v.
Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); DeMare v. Dep’t Human Servs., No.
A06-803, 2006 WL 2533922, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006).
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I. GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER AND TREATMENTS
GID is a psychiatric condition recognized by the mental health
community that varies in terms of severity and required treatment.9
Mental health professionals identify GID by the presentation of four
criteria: cross gender identification;10 persistent discomfort with one’s
sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role that is associ-
ated with that sex;11 disturbance is not concurrent with a physical
intersex condition (sexual development disorder);12 and impairment
or distress as a result of the cross gender identification that results
in a negative impact on their lives.13 To be considered a “mental dis-
order,” the impairment or distress must rise to such a level that it
causes “a significant adaptive disadvantage to the person or cause
personal mental suffering.”14
Treatment for those with GID differs based on severity of the
symptoms and the desires of the patient and treating mental health
professional.15 Not all patients want or need SRS.16 According to best
estimates, 1 in 11,900 natal males and 1 in 30,400 natal females
qualify as having gender identity disorder.17 In contrast, only 1 in
30,000 natal males and 1 in 100,000 natal females seek SRS.18 For
this reason, treatment guidelines suggest a tiered scheme for treat-
ing patients with GID.19
The first tier of treatment consists of psychotherapy.20 Psycho-
therapy provides an educational role along with various mechanisms
for the patient to use as a way to cope with anxieties and distress
that result from GID.21 The goal of psychotherapy is not to cure the
disorder but to allow the patient to cope in a healthy manner.22 The
9. See HARRY BENJAMIN INT’L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS’N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 2 (6th ed. 2001) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF CARE]; Peggy T.
Cohen-Kettenis & Friedemann Pfäfflin, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity
Disorder in Adolescents and Adults, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 499, 499 (2010).
10. Cohen-Kettenis & Pfäfflin, supra note 9, at 510.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 6.
15. Id. at 1–2.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 2.
18. William Byne et al., Report of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force
on Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 759, 760 n.1 (2012).
19. See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 2.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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treatment guidelines stress that not all GID patients require psycho-
therapy.23 In many instances psychotherapy should be utilized through-
out the other stages of treatment to assist in the gender transition.24
Another treatment requires the patient to live as the opposite
gender.25 This real-life experience has the patient adopt living as the
opposite gender into all aspects of life.26 This stage is not as simple
as it sounds. Often the real-life experience has great social and per-
sonal consequences.27
To assist with the real-life experience, hormone therapy is often
used.28 The treatment guidelines provide valuable insight into the
effects of hormones on GID patients:
Hormones are often medically necessary for successful living in
the new gender. They improve the quality of life and limit psychi-
atric co-morbidity, which often accompanies lack of treatment.
When physicians administer androgens to biologic females and
estrogens, progesterone, and testosterone-blocking agents to bio-
logic males, patients feel and appear more like members of their
preferred gender.29
The use of hormone therapy also indicates whether SRS may be
appropriate. Any ambivalence to the hormone treatment could be
noted and indicate that SRS is improper.30 In other cases, the hor-
mone treatment provides sufficient change to the patient to ease the
anxieties resulting from GID.31
The last method of treatment that health care professionals
may use to treat GID is SRS.32 The treatment guidelines only recom-
mend SRS for “severe” cases of GID.33 They note that SRS is an ef-
fective method to treat GID when used alongside hormone treatment
and real-life experience.34 The guidelines also note that “[s]ex reas-
signment [surgery] is not ‘experimental,’ ‘investigational,’ ‘elective,’
‘cosmetic,’ or optional in any meaningful sense. It constitutes very
effective and appropriate treatment for transsexualism or profound
23. Id.
24. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 11.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 13.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id.
34. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 18.
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GID.” 35 Simply because the surgery alters the physical appearance
of the body does not mean it is inappropriate as a means of treat-
ment for a mental disorder.36
SRS includes both breast and genital surgeries.37 Depending on
the severity and needs of the patient, various forms of SRS are
available.38 These surgeries also vary significantly in cost. The most
comprehensive study of the cost of SRS conducted in 2001 demon-
strates that the range of procedures vary by up to $55,000.39 In many
cases, the cost of SRS is prohibitively expensive. Absent health in-
surance, surgery can cost anywhere from $30,000 to $80,000.40 The
cost is great to the payer, whether it be the insurer or the individual.
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROVISION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY TREATMENT
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has greatly broad-
ened the scope of the Eighth Amendment beyond “torture[s] and
other barbar[ous]” punishments.41 In 1910, the Supreme Court pro-
scribed any punishment that was “incompatible with ‘the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”42
The Court also eliminated any punishment that “involve[s] the un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 43
These holdings allowed for further expansion of the Eighth
Amendment in 1976 to require the government to provide adequate
medical care for the imprisoned, as established in Estelle v. Gamble.44
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.
In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical
“torture or a lingering death,” . . . [t]he evils of most immediate
concern to the drafters of the Amendment. In less serious cases,
denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no
one suggests would serve any penological purpose. The infliction
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 19–20.
38. Id. at 19–22; see also Horton, supra note 7, at 3.
39. Horton, supra note 7, at 2.
40. Pauline Kim, Massachusetts Judge Rules for Inmate’s Sex-Change Surgery, CNN
(Sept. 6, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/04/health/massachusetts-sex-change
-surgery-inmate.
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
42. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1910)).
43. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
44. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
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of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codify-
ing the common-law view that “[i]t is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.” 45
Inmates do not have access to adequate medical care, except through
the prison authorities; thus, the denial by prison authorities to pro-
vide such treatment violates common standards of decency.46 The
Court, therefore, established the deliberate indifference standard for
determining Eighth Amendment violations concerning the denial or
inefficient provision of medical care.47
The Supreme Court, however, did not define “deliberate indiffer-
ence” until eighteen years after deciding Gamble.48 In Farmer v.
Brennan, the Court defined the deliberate indifference standard by
using a two-prong, objective and subjective test.49 A prison official
is deliberately indifferent “if he knows that inmates face a substan-
tial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” 50 Not only must the inmate face
an objectively substantial risk of harm, but the prison authorities
also must be aware of this risk, and yet not act on it, in order to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.51
The burden on officials to provide treatment when they have
knowledge of a serious medical need, however, is not absolute.52 The
Court left prison officials with a level of discretion within their “delib-
erate indifference” analysis.53 To establish an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, prison officials could have no “legitimate purpose”
to limit treatment.54 If the prison officials can establish a valid, good
faith basis for limiting treatment, there would be no violation.55
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation by denial of medi-
cal treatment, the prisoner must demonstrate: the prisoner had a
serious medical need,56 the prisoner received no adequate treatment
for this serious medical need,57 prison officials knew of the prisoner’s
45. Id. at 103–04 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
46. Id. at 103–04.
47. Id at 105.
48. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
49. Id. at 845–46.
50. Id. at 847.
51. Id. at 846 n.9.
52. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986).
53. Id. at 320.
54. Id. at 322.
55. Id.
56. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
57. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
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serious medical need,58 and prison officials made the decision to
withhold treatment due to “bad faith and for no legitimate purpose.” 59
III. JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING PRISONERS WITH GENDER
IDENTITY DISORDER
Jurisprudence regarding transgender inmates has evolved greatly
over the past twenty-five years. In general, courts have become more
willing to provide treatment for prisoners with GID. In 1986, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff, a transgender prisoner.60 Plaintiff requested
that he be transferred to a women’s correctional facility, provided cos-
metics and female clothing, and that he receive hormone therapy
treatment in preparation for SRS.61 The court dismissed the request
for transfer by stating that though the prisoner’s comfort may be re-
lieved, the comfort of the women at the all female facility would out-
weigh plaintiff’s interest in comfort and result in a rational interest
in segregating prisoners by sex.62 The court then set aside the re-
quest for female clothes and cosmetics as being at the discretion of
the prison officials.63 The court failed to recognize the potential for
these actions in and of themselves to satisfy the “real-life experi-
ence” treatment.64
The court also expressed doubt that plaintiff was even a trans-
sexual.65 The court challenged plaintiff’s medical documentation
confirming his diagnosis by stating that plaintiff was a nonconform-
ist that “receive[d] an ‘apparent delight in defying conventions, rules
and regulations . . . .’” 66 The language of the opinion gave little cre-
dence to the validity of an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of
real-life experience treatment for transsexual prisoners.67 The Lamb
court exemplified the hostility to GID treatment requests by courts
when these issues first emerged in the mid 1980s.
58. See id.
59. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986).
60. Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1986).
61. Id. at 352.
62. Id. at 353.
63. Id.
64. See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 17.
65. Lamb, 633 F. Supp. at 353–54.
66. Id. at 354.
67. Id. at 353–54. Reference to transsexualism prior to the year 1994 is synonymous
with the gender identity disorder diagnosis. See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 9, at 4.
The DSM-IV committee (the committee that revised the American Psychiatric Association
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) changed the diagnosis from transsexualism to gender
identity disorder to avoid confusion due to the gradual expansion of the use of the term
“transsexual.” Id.
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A few months after the district court of Kansas decided Lamb,
Supre v. Ricketts echoed the belief that as long as the prison officials
provided some sort of treatment, the court would defer to the medi-
cal judgment of the prison physicians and psychiatrists.68 In this
instance, the prisoner-plaintiff made multiple attempts to castrate
himself, resulting in surgical removal of his testicles due to the
severe damage.69 Rather than provide the plaintiff with the estrogen
therapy he requested, the prison medical staff determined that tes-
tosterone replacement therapy and mental health treatment would
be the proper course of treatment.70 The denial of the specifically
requested treatment, the court concluded, did not establish a delib-
erate indifference to a serious medical need.71 The court indicated
that the plaintiff had to demonstrate a “situation where there was
a total failure to give medical attention” to establish a claim.72 The
light standard allowed the court to hold that the prison officials did
not violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right.73
The first instance of a court recognizing a need for the treatment
of gender identity disorder occurred in Meriweather v. Faulkner.74
The court in that case established for the first time that gender
identity disorder was a “serious medical need” worthy of Eighth
Amendment protection.75 “There is no reason to treat transsexual-
ism differently than any other psychiatric disorder.” 76 Additionally,
the court reiterated the requirement of prison officials to provide
some therapy.77 The court found that the prison officials had knowl-
edge of this serious medical need through multiple complaints made
by the petitioners.78 The prison officials ignored these complaints
and took no action to treat the prisoner’s gender identity disorder,
so their actions reached a level of deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s need.79 The court reiterated, however, that the prisoner
had no constitutional right to estrogen therapy, only that he had a
constitutional right to some medical treatment.80 The court indicated
68. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 960.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 963.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 413.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).
2014] SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY 633
that deference should be given to prison officials as to the type of
treatment given to the transsexual prisoner.81
The first court holding requiring prison officials to provide
estrogen therapy occurred in the 1990 case Phillips v. Michigan
Department of Corrections.82 Once again the court reiterated that gen-
der identity disorder is a “serious medical need” within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.83 The court ordered the prison officials to
provide estrogen treatment due to three factors specific to the facts
of this case.84 First, prison officials did not provide any treatment to
the prisoner for his serious medical need.85 Second, the prisoner was
“the subject of ridicule and offensive remarks.” 86 Finally, the denial
of estrogen treatment “reversed the therapeutic effects of previous
treatment.” 87 The court, therefore, granted a preliminary injunction
to give the prisoner access to estrogen therapy.88 The holding of this
case turned on the fact that the prisoner had received significant
treatment, including hormone therapy, prior to incarceration.89 The
court made sure to emphasize that prison officials could refuse to
provide sex reassignment surgery, as the surgery would be treat-
ment to improve the prisoner’s medical condition.90
Almost ten years following the Lamb decision, denials of treat-
ment to prisoners suffering from GID rarely provided protection,
although the language of the opinions indicated a less dismissive
approach to the claims. In Long v. Nix, the court denied treatment,
contrary to expert testimony and generally accepted medical stan-
dards, because of a dual diagnosis of fetishism and the belief that
the plaintiff could not engage in the “real-life experience” treatment
due to the fact that he was incarcerated.91
The court acknowledged that transsexualism and gender iden-
tity disorder was a “serious psychiatric disorder” creating a constitu-
tional right to “some type of medical treatment,” consistent with
precedent cases, but it still denied the prisoner any protection in
this instance.92 Despite the expert’s recommendation for treatment,
81. Id. at 414.
82. Phillips v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
83. Id. at 799.
84. Id. at 800.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Phillips v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990). Plaintiff
received estrogen treatment prior to incarceration. Id. at 794.
88. Id. at 801.
89. Id. at 800–01.
90. Id. at 800.
91. Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1365–66 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
92. Id. at 1364–65.
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the court determined that the prisoner’s gender identity disorder in
this case did not “constitute a serious medical need for which treat-
ment is mandated.” 93 Again the court granted deference to the prison’s
medical authorities to determine the course of treatment necessary
for the inmate.94
Twenty-first century jurisprudence regarding transsexuals tends
to provide for a much more liberal view of the necessary treatment
to be provided to prisoners with GID. In Wolfe v. Horn, the court
reiterated that the refusal by prison officials to continue to provide
hormone therapy to prisoners that had received hormone treatment
prior to incarceration could be considered deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need.95 Though the court stressed that deference
should be given to the medical decisions made by prison officials
when some treatment was provided, it also stated that to abruptly
withdraw hormone treatment and failure to treat withdrawal symp-
toms “could constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’” 96
Following this case, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts followed the previous precedent but utilized dicta to
institute some medical care for inmates struggling with GID.97 In
this case, plaintiff Kosilek was a prisoner suffering from severe
GID.98 In an effort to determine what kind of treatment to provide
Kosilek, prison officials established a blanket administrative policy
that prisoners with GID would receive the same treatment that they
were provided prior to incarceration—the freeze-frame approach.99
Prison officials considered providing for treatment to address Kosilek’s
stress, anxiety, and depression through therapy sessions and psycho-
tropic medications.100 The court determined that Kosilek suffered
from a very severe case of GID and that the blanket freeze-frame
policy did not allow Kosilek to receive adequate treatment.101 The
treatment that Kosilek received was “so clearly inadequate as to
amount to a refusal to provide essential care.”102 Despite this, the
93. Id. at 1365.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652–53 (E.D. Penn. 2001).
96. Id. at 653.
97. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 191 (D. Mass. 2002).
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id. at 171–73. Prisoners prescribed hormone therapy prior to incarceration were
allowed to continue hormone therapy. Id. at 171. The policy prohibited prisoners suffer-
ing with GID that had not received hormone therapy prior to incarceration to receive
this treatment once incarcerated. The policy provided for no exceptions. Id.
100. Id. at 174.
101. Id. at 186–87.
102. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 185 (D. Mass. 2002) (quoting Torraco
v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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court did not find an Eighth Amendment violation because prison
officials had not acted with deliberate indifference when determining
the type of treatment to provide Kosilek.103 The court also stressed
that concerns about treatment being an inappropriate utilization of
taxpayer money were improper.104 If Maloney refused to provide
adequate treatment for GID in the future because of concerns about
appropriate taxpayer expenditures and public disapproval, his ac-
tions would constitute deliberate indifference and would violate the
Eighth Amendment.105
Though the court could not order an injunction to require prison
officials to provide Kosilek with adequate treatment, the court’s dicta
in effect required prison officials to take this action anyway.106 The
court stressed that the conclusions of this trial placed Maloney on
notice that Kosilek had a serious medical need and required ade-
quate medical treatment.107 The court then laid out what treatment
would satisfy the adequacy requirement.
The evidence demonstrates that, at a minimum, Kosilek
should receive genuine psychotherapy from, or under the direc-
tion of, someone qualif ied by training and experience to address
a severe gender identity disorder.
. . . .
If psychotherapy, and possibly psychopharmacology, do not
eliminate the significant risk of serious harm that now exists,
consideration should be given to whether hormones should be
prescribed to treat Kosilek.108
The court also addressed the security concerns that could arise
from prescribing the adequate treatment to eliminate Kosilek’s suf-
fering as a result from GID and dismissed them.109 Though Maloney
should take security concerns into consideration, the court cited
evidence indicating that security issues could easily be dealt with or
were not serious concerns.110 The court indicated that Maloney
103. Id. at 195. The court made this determination because Maloney, the off icial ulti-
mately in charge of prison administration policies, was not a medical professional and
he reasonably relied on the advice of attorneys that the Eighth Amendment only re-
quired some treatment, but not hormone therapy unless prescribed before incarceration.
Id. at 190–91.
104. Id. at 192.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 193–95.
107. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 193 (D. Mass. 2002).
108. Id. at 193–94. This dicta set the stage in many ways for Kosilek II.
109. Id. at 194.
110. Specif ically, the court noted that prison off icials were prepared to deal with
security concerns that arose with inmates that had been on hormone therapy prior to
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would likely not violate Kosilek’s rights in the future.111 The dicta of
this opinion stressed the actions that Maloney and prison officials
should take to avoid future violations and thus had the same practi-
cal effect as an injunction in favor of Kosilek.112
The court came close to requiring sex reassignment surgery in
2012, but fell just short of requiring the prison officials to provide
it for a transgender prisoner.113 Similar to the Kosilek case, Soneeya
v. Spencer concerned a department of corrections administrative
policy.114 This policy prohibited laser hair removal, plastic surgery,
and sex reassignment surgery as medically unnecessary to treat GID,
contrary to the standards of care.115 His suit requested an injunction
to provide laser hair removal and sex reassignment surgery.116
The court found that the plaintiff’s multiple attempts at self-
castration and suicide, in addition to his medical diagnosis, estab-
lished that his GID created a serious medical need.117 The blanket
policy prohibiting consideration of further feminization or sex reas-
signment surgery prevented the plaintiff from receiving “adequate
medical treatment” to treat his GID.118 The court also established
that the prison officials knew of the plaintiff’s medical need yet
created numerous obstacles and delays to granting his treatment,
establishing deliberate indifference.119 Though the court granted the
injunction to remove the blanket policy and allow for the plaintiff to
be considered for sex reassignment surgery and other feminization
procedures, the court did not order prison officials to grant sex reas-
signment surgery.120 The court stopped just short of requiring SRS
because of some conflicting evidence as to the necessity of sex reas-
signment surgery in this case.121
incarceration and would continue in prison. Id. Additionally, other courts have provided
inmates with hormone therapy and placed these prisoners in the general population of
prisons with little incident. Id. Finally, the court noted that Kosilek had been living, in
many ways, as a woman within the general population already and had posed no secu-
rity risk. Id.
111. Id. at 193.
112. See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 193–95 (D. Mass. 2002).
113. Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012).
114. Id. at 240.
115. Id. The plaintiff, Soneeya, sought various forms of treatment for her GID over many
years. Id. at 236. Specif ically, “Ms. Soneeya waited nine years after her initial diagnosis
to receive a treatment plan that applied community standards of care. She waited an-
other four years to receive an evaluation by an expert in gender identity disorders.” Id.
at 248.
116. Id. at 238, 252.
117. Id. at 244–45.
118. Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 247 (D. Mass. 2012).
119. Id. at 248.
120. Id. at 252.
121. Id.
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IV. KOSILEK II AND THE COURT ORDER FOR SEX
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
Recall that though the court in Kosilek I did not issue an injunc-
tion requiring action on the part of the Department of Corrections
(DOC) to provide for hormone treatment for Kosilek’s GID, the court
utilized dicta to put the DOC on notice of Kosilek’s need for care.122
In response to Kosilek I, the DOC changed the “freeze-frame” policy
to one that allowed for hormone therapy for those who had received
it by prescription prior to incarceration.123 The change also allowed
for increases or decreases in this treatment if deemed medically
necessary, and had the approval of the Director of Health Services
Division and the Commissioner of the DOC.124 In 2003, the DOC’s
gender identity disorder specialist evaluated Kosilek and recom-
mended estrogen therapy, electrolysis, access to female clothing, and
makeup.125 Additionally, he notified the DOC that Kosilek should be
reevaluated after a year of recommended treatment to determine if
SRS was necessary.126 During Kosilek’s reevaluation, the DOC’s con-
tracted GID specialists determined in multiple reports that Kosilek
had a medical need for SRS.127 Without SRS, reports indicated that
Kosilek would continue to be “quite distressed” and that he would likely
attempt suicide due to loss of hope and suffering caused by his GID.128
At the same time, the DOC Commissioner, Kathleen Dennehy,
and her predecessor, Michael Maloney, took various efforts to “delay,
and ultimately deny, the medical care that was being prescribed for
Kosilek.”129 They replaced many GID experts that recommended SRS,
with GID experts that categorically opposed SRS for inmates.130
Maloney terminated GID expert Dr. David Seil following his eval-
uation that SRS was a possible medically necessary treatment of
Kosilek.131 Dennehy attempted to persuade representatives of the
University of Massachusetts (UMass) (the contracted DOC medical
provider) not to retain doctors from Fenway Community Health Cen-
ter of Massachusetts (Fenway) to treat inmates with GID.132 Dennehy
122. See supra Part III.
123. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 218 (D. Mass. 2012).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 220–22.
128. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 221, 226 (D. Mass. 2012).
129. Id. at 220.
130. Id. at 220–21.
131. Id. at 218–19.
132. Id. at 220 (stating that Fenway was the “foremost referral center in New England
for individuals with gender identity disorders. However, in view of the Fenway Clinic’s
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also instructed UMass to retain Licensed Social Worker Cynthia Os-
borne due to her history of opposition to SRS for inmates.133 Dennehy
testified that she did not understand the determination by Fenway’s
GID specialists that the requested SRS for Kosilek resulted from
medical necessity.134 Yet she gave multiple interviews to media out-
lets that indicated the contrary.135 Additionally, Dennehy’s testimony
indicated her strong opposition to becoming the first corrections
official to allow an inmate to receive SRS using taxpayer money.136
The DOC attempted to justify its delays and denials by arguing
that providing SRS would create insurmountable security concerns,
both concerning Kosilek’s potential escape and assaults resulting
from his living in general population of either a male or female cor-
rections facility.137 These concerns as expressed by two expert wit-
nesses were insufficient for the court.138
When Kosilek once again sued the DOC for violating his rights
under the Eighth Amendment, the District Court of Massachusetts
became the first court to issue an injunction that required that an
inmate receive sex reassignment surgery.139 The court followed the
proper Eighth Amendment analysis to come to this conclusion.140
Kosilek must prove that: (1) he has a serious medical need; (2) sex
reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment for it; (3) the
defendant knows that Kosilek is at high risk of serious harm if
he does not receive sex reassignment surgery; (4) the defendant
has not denied that treatment because of good faith, reasonable
security concerns or for any other legitimate penological purpose;
reputation, it was foreseeable that Fenway doctors might recommend laser hair removal
and sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek . . . . [UMass] had no other options [but to
retain Fenway]”).
133. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 220, 221 (D. Mass. 2012). Osborne worked
for well-known sex reassignment surgery opponent and psychiatrist, Dr. Paul McHugh
at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. Id. at 221. Additionally, she held the belief that in-
mates could never satisfy the “real-life experience” requirement of the Standards of Care
and, therefore, could never qualify for SRS. Id. In practice with the Virginia Department
of Corrections and Wisconsin Department of Corrections, her denials of SRS ended in two
inmate self castrations. Id.
134. Id. at 202.
135. Id. at 201–03.
136. Id. at 223.
137. Id. at 224.
138. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 239–40 (D. Mass. 2012). Security expert
Beeler “formed his opinion [about the security risks] before visiting any DOC facility or
learning anything specif ic to Kosilek.” Id. at 225. The other expert, Dumond, did not
“consider Kosilek’s history of living safely as a woman” at his present correctional fa-
cility. Id.
139. Id. at 250–51.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
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and (5) the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct will continue in
the future.141
In establishing that Kosilek still had a serious medical need despite
having received hormone therapy, Kosilek’s illness was determined
to still pose a “substantial risk . . . [of] serious harm.”142 Kosilek’s
past behavior of attempted suicide and castration indicated that if
SRS were denied, he posed a substantial risk of serious harm to
himself.143 Additionally, a serious medical need may be defined by
a “diagnos[is] by a physician . . . mandating treatment.”144 Kosilek
also satisfies this definition of a serious medical need.145 The mental
health experts that examined Kosilek, with the exception of Osborne,
all determined that sex reassignment surgery was “medically neces-
sary.”146 Additionally, seven U.S. Courts of Appeals determined that
severe GID constitutes a serious medical need.147
Yet the court recognized that an inmate does not have the
ability to choose his care, rather, the requested treatment must be
considered the only adequate treatment to treat the serious medical
need.148 The treatment must be “reasonably commensurate with mod-
ern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent pro-
fessional standards.”149 When dealing with GID, modern medical
standards are those outlined in the STANDARDS OF CARE.150 Physi-
cians must also base treatment on an individualized assessment of
the patient’s needs.151 When evaluated by mental health profession-
als specializing in GID that followed the STANDARDS OF CARE, all
but Schmidt determined that Kosilek required the sex reassignment
surgery as treatment for GID.152 The court also determined that the
suggestion of psychotherapy, suicide watch, and antidepressants as
treatment of the severe emotional distress instead of SRS was insuffi-
cient.153 This treatment, as it treats only the symptoms of the disorder,
141. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 212 (D. Mass. 2012).
142. Id. at 229 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 835–47 (1994)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 835–47; McGuckin v. Smith 974 F.2d. 1050,
1059 (9th Cir. 1992)).
146. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 233 (D. Mass. 2012).
147. Id. at 230.
148. Id. at 236.
149. Id. at 207 (citing United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1987)).
150. Id. (citing Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158–59 (D. Mass. 2002)).
151. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 207–08 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Roe v.
Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2011), Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242,
249–50 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 193 (D. Mass. 2002)).
152. See Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
153. Id. at 235–36.
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not the disorder itself, is inadequate for an Eighth Amendment ob-
jection absent penological concerns.154 The court determined that
Kosilek’s serious medical need required SRS as the only adequate
treatment for GID, satisfying the objective prong of the deliberate
indifference test.155
In order to determine whether the subjective prong of the delib-
erate indifference test was satisfied, the court had to determine that
the relevant decision maker knew of and disregarded “excessive risk
to inmate health or safety, . . . facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.”156 The relevant decision maker in the DOC
did know of Kosilek’s serious medical need and that lack of treat-
ment created a substantial risk of serious harm to him, particularly
through suicide, due to the multiple clinical reports and recommen-
dations by Fenway doctors to the DOC commissioner.157 Addition-
ally, the DOC was put on notice of the severity of Kosilek’s GID and
potential consequences of denying medically necessary treatment by
the Kosilek I decision.158 These established actual knowledge and
disregard of Kosilek’s serious medical need and lack of adequate
treatment on the part of the DOC.159
Despite the knowledge of DOC decision makers, the court deter-
mined that if adequate security or penological concerns were estab-
lished, the DOC would not have violated the Eighth Amendment.160
Yet, the court found that DOC simply used security concerns as a
pretext to deny Kosilek’s medically necessary treatment.161 First,
upon becoming acting Commissioner of DOC, Dennehy immediately
halted any further provision of treatment to Kosilek, despite her
lack of knowledge and expertise in medical treatment of GID.162
Additionally, Dennehy hired SRS opponents in order to counter the
154. Id. at 208 (citing Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 2011); Wolfe v. Horn,
130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E. D. Penn. 2001) (stating that although transexual inmate
was prescribed Prozac for depression, there was a fact question precluding summary
judgment as to whether inmate received any treatment for transsexualism); West v.
Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3rd Cir. 1978) (providing aspirin rather than recommended
post-operative treatment may not constitute adequate medical care); Sulton v. Wright,
265 F. Supp. 2d, 292, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that treatment of symptoms rather
than the underlying condition is presumptively inadequate treatment)).
155. Id. at 236.
156. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208–09 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
157. Id. at 222.
158. Id. at 217.
159. Id. at 237–38.
160. Id. at 199.
161. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Mass. 2012).
162. Id. at 202.
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recommendations by Fenway’s doctors.163 Dennehy also falsely stated
that she did not understand the recommendation for SRS.164 Finally,
Dennehy’s interviews to media outlets about the DOC’s denial of
SRS due to safety and security concerns were given prior to any re-
port on the actual impact of safety and security SRS would have.165
The actual testimony about security additionally did not consider
the particular facts of Kosilek’s confinement.166 All alternative plans
for Kosilek’s confinement were not considered in determining secu-
rity risks resulting from his SRS.167 In conjunction with these facts,
Dennehy also stated that she would be motivated to deny SRS for
political reasons, which is an invalid reason to deny medically neces-
sary treatment to an inmate.168 Collectively these facts indicated bad
faith on the part of DOC’s denial of SRS to Kosilek.169 The denial of
SRS to Kosilek, the court concluded, resulted in the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.170
The court proceeded to grant an injunction for the DOC to make
reasonable efforts to provide Kosilek with SRS.171 The court deter-
mined that despite its favor for judicial restraint, past actions by the
DOC indicated that absent an injunction, the denial of proper treat-
ment for Kosilek would continue.172 This conclusion is the result of
three factors: (1) the DOC has spent the greater part of the past
decade denying Kosilek treatment for GID in some way;173 (2) the
attempts to deny treatment persisted through trial and after the
resignation of Commissioner Dennehy;174 (3) transsexual inmates
have suffered a pattern of unconstitutional denial of treatment.175
These factors allowed the court to enact an unprecedented injunc-
tion.176 When an inmate suffers from severe GID such that SRS is
a medically necessary procedure and is denied such treatment as a
result of deliberate indifference, the Department of Corrections must
163. Id.
164. Id. Evidence indicated that Dennehy wrote to the Director of Bureau of Prisons
concerning the recommendation for SRS. Id.
165. Id. at 203.
166. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 224–25 (D. Mass. 2012).
167. Id. at 243–45.
168. Id. at 203.
169. Id. at 247.
170. Id. at 217 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002)).
171. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 251 (D. Mass. 2012).
172. Id. at 250.
173. Id. at 248.
174. Id. at 249.
175. Id. at 249–50 (citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011); Soneeya
v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 251 (D. Mass. 2012); Brugliera v. Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t
of Corrs., No. 07-40323-JLT, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 131002, at *26 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009)).
176. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 250 (D. Mass. 2012).
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take “all of the steps reasonably necessary to provide [the inmate]
that treatment as promptly as possible.”177
V. LACK OF COVERAGE FOR SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
UNDER MEDICAID, MEDICARE, AND CHAMPUS
Though SRS may be required for inmates in situations similar
to Kosilek, many less culpable people suffering from GID do not
have the ability to obtain sex reassignment surgery. As a result of
Kosilek II, the only transgendered people who rely on the federal
government for health care and can receive SRS are incarcerated
criminals.178 Those that rely on the federal government for health
care insurance, through Medicaid, Medicare, and military health in-
surance programs, have virtually no access to SRS even if it is from
a clinical perspective “medically necessary,” because SRS is prohibi-
tively expensive.179
A. Medicaid
State regulations and statutes concerning Medicaid in many
cases are hostile to providing beneficiaries access to SRS. Many
states, including Iowa, Minnesota, and New York, specifically pro-
hibit the use of funds for sex reassignment surgery, even if surgery
is medically necessary.180 In addition, federal courts denied coverage
of “medically necessary” SRS in instances when states fail to ad-
dress whether SRS is covered or not.181 Only in California has a
court held that SRS is required under Medicaid and that ruling
remains good law.182
Iowa specifically excluded SRS in its Medicaid coverage and sur-
vived a challenge as improper under the federal Medicaid statute.183
The regulation states:
177. Id. at 204–05.
178. Id. at 250.
179. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755,760 (8th Cir. 2001); Casillas v.
Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); DeMare v. Dep’t Human Servs., No.
A06-803, 2006 WL 2533922, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006).
180. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4) (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625(3a)
(West 2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 §505.2( l ) (2013).
181. See Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980); Rush v. Johnson, 565
F. Supp. 856, 857–58 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
182. G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that SRS must be covered by Medicaid on a statutory basis. Doe v.
Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1977). The legislature inval-
idated this holding by explicitly prohibiting coverage of SRS through legislation. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625(3a) (West 2013).
183. Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 759–62 (8th Cir. 2001).
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For the purposes of this program, cosmetic, reconstructive, or
plastic surgery is surgery which can be expected primarily to im-
prove physical appearance or which is performed primarily for
psychological purposes or which restores form but which does
not correct or materially improve the bodily functions . . . . Sur-
geries for the purposes of sex reassignment are not considered
as restoring bodily function and are excluded from coverage.184
The inapplicability of Medicaid coverage for SRS procedures is also
reiterated in the statue two more times.185 First, “[c]osmetic, recon-
structive, or plastic surgery performed in connection with certain
conditions is specifically excluded. These conditions are: (2) Procedures
related to transsexualism . . . [or] gender identity disorders . . . .”186
Finally, the statute states that the “[f]ollowing is a partial list of
cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery procedures which are not
covered under the program . . . . (15) Sex reassignment.”187 Iowa
clearly eliminated any leeway in statutory interpretation through
this legislation.188
Additionally, legislation prohibiting coverage of SRS is valid
under the federal Medicaid regulation. Smith v. Rasmussen chal-
lenged the regulation on the grounds that the state could not place
such a limitation on medically necessary services and that the state
should give deference to physician and patient decisions.189 The
court held that limitations on medically necessary services were
valid as long as they were not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”190 The
prohibition of coverage for SRS was not considered arbitrary or
capricious, and, therefore, valid, because the Iowa Department of
Human Services allowed for review of regulations by the medical
community for appropriateness.191
Similar to the Iowa statute, Minnesota explicitly prohibited
Medicaid coverage of SRS.192 Legislators reacted to an initial holding
of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1977, that the blanket prohibi-
tion of SRS coverage, as outlined in the Medical Assistance Program
184. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4) (2013).
185. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b),(d)(15) (2013).
186. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b) (2013).
187. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(d)(15) (2013).
188. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b),(d)(15) (2013).
189. Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2001).
190. Id. at 760.
191. Id. A previous case, Pinneke v. Preisser, challenged the same regulation successfully
prior to review by a committee made up of representatives of the medical community. The
case was distinguished from Rasmussen on this basis. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546,
547 (8th Cir. 1980).
192. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625(3a) (West 2013).
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Physician’s Handbook without force of law, void.193 In response to
the fact that the holding limited only non-statutory guidelines, the
Minnesota legislature amended the statutory provision of covered
services to eliminate SRS in 2005.194 The new law stated, “[s]ex re-
assignment surgery is not covered.”195 Though dicta in Doe v. Minne-
sota Department of Public Welfare indicated that it was improper to
make any blanket determination concerning medically necessary
treatment,196 the only challenge to the 2005 amended statute failed,
without considering the language of Doe.197
In New York, “[p]ayment is not available for care, services, drugs,
or supplies rendered for the purpose of gender reassignment (also
known as transsexual surgery) or any care, services, drugs, or sup-
plies intended to promote such treatment.”198 In 2008, a patient
challenged the statutory limitations on SRS and other proscribed
GID treatments for Medicaid coverage.199 The plaintiff challenged
that the proscription violated both the federal regulations for states
receiving federal Medicaid funding, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause.200 The court dismissed the suit for failure to
state a claim, because New York’s proscription of SRS coverage was
an “appropriate limit” under federal Medicaid legislation201 and the
legislature had a rational basis in enacting the prohibition.202
Three years later, politicians in New York considered removing
the total prohibition of Medicaid funding for medically necessary
SRS.203 A Medicaid redesign task force recommended eliminating
193. Doe v. Minn. Dep’t Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977).
194. Omnibus Healthcare Services Bill, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2520 (West).
195. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625(3a) (West 2013).
196. Doe v. Minn. Dep’t Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977). The court
stated, “[t]he total exclusion of transsexual surgery from eligibility for [medical assis-
tance] benefits is directly related to the type of treatment involved and, therefore, is in
direct contravention of [45 C.F.R. § 249.10].” Id. at 820.
197. DeMare v. Minn. Dept. of Human Servs., No. A06-803, 2006 WL 2533922, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006).
198. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 505.2( l ) (2013).
199. Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Denise R. v.
Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 279, 284 (1979) (upholding decision of Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Social Services to deny authorization for sex reassignment surgery).
200. Casillas, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
201. Id. at 242–43.
202. Id. at 247. “The state agency’s assessment of public comment on the proposed reg-
ulation explained succinctly the reasons for denying reimbursement of gender reassign-
ment surgeries and associated treatments. It cited ‘serious complications’ from the
surgeries . . . . This provided a more than suff icient rational basis which was related to
legitimate government interests—the health of its citizens and the conservation of
limited medical resources.” Id.
203. NY Administration Rejects Medicaid Sex Changes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2011,
4:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/APc7636fc64eab462ca1644ef0ca1ad325.html.
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the prohibition on Medicaid coverage of GID treatment including
SRS.204 Despite this recommendation, the Cuomo administration
quickly rejected the recommendation.205
In states that do not outright prohibit Medicaid coverage of
SRS, courts have shown no willingness to require the coverage of
these procedures. The Fifth Circuit, for example, denied the exten-
sion of coverage because it considered SRS experimental treat-
ment.206 The court reasoned that states had the ability to “define
medical necessity in a way tailored to the requirements of its own
Medicaid program.” 207 Essentially, the state can reject coverage of
a procedure that is medically unnecessary because the state defines
it as medically unnecessary.208 Though the attending physician has
the “primary responsibility of determining what treatment should
be made available to his patients,” 209 the physician must “operate
within such reasonable limitations as the state may impose.” 210 The
court reasoned that the Georgia limitation on experimental proce-
dures was reasonable.211 It held that because SRS was experimental,
the Georgia Medicaid program may deny coverage of SRS.212
Currently, the only state that guarantees SRS under its Med-
icaid program as when medically necessary is California.213 G.B. v.
Lackner set forth the precedent requiring Medi-Cal to fund SRS when
medically necessary.214 Much of this result rests on California’s
Medi-Cal regulations and the requirements therein.215 The California
Administrative Code required that Medi-Cal provide coverage for
“health care services which are reasonable and necessary for the pre-
vention, diagnosis and treatment of disease, illness or injury. . . .” 216
The court also categorized SRS as more than mere cosmetic surgery,
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1155 (5th Cir. 1980). The court dodged the ques-
tion as to whether the state of Georgia was required to provide coverage of all medically
necessary procedures for Medicaid recipients. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (“The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as conferring broad dis-
cretion on the States to adopt standards for determining the extent of medical assistance,
requiring only that such standards be ‘reasonable’ and ‘consistent with the objectives’
of the Act.” (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (internal quotations omitted))).
209. Id. at 1156.
210. Id.
211. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980).
212. Id. at 1155.
213. G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 558.
216. Id.
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which would be prohibited under Medi-Cal regulations.217 Rather,
Medi-Cal must cover medically necessary SRS procedures and can-
not arbitrarily define SRS as a cosmetic surgery to avoid such cov-
erage.218 California, however, is the exception to the rule. All other
federal court analyses do not require states to provide SRS to those
suffering from GID with physician recommendation and approval
for the procedure.219
B. Medicare
Though the federal and state governments provide health care
for the needy through Medicaid programs that in practice prohibit
funding for SRS, Medicare also provides health care insurance cov-
erage for the elderly and disabled of the United States.220 In 2011,
forty-eight million people utilized Medicare for health insurance.221
Yet SRS remains excluded from Medicare coverage.222
The National Coverage Determinations (NCDs) outline the par-
ticular services covered under the Medicare program.223 Manual
Section 140.3 of the NCDs prohibits Medicare reimbursement for
SRS due to its controversy.224 It classifies the surgery as high risk
and experimental.225 Similar to the Medicaid coverage, Medicare
regulations establish a blanket prohibition on SRS coverage regard-
less of medical necessity.226
217. Id. at 559.
218. G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
219. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 756 (8th Cir. 2011); Rush v. Parham,
625 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1980); Ravenwood v. Daines, 06-CV-6355-CJS, 2009
WL 2163105, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009).
220. Pulling It Together: Medicare, Medicaid, and the Multiplier Effect, THE KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (June 9, 2011), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/perspective/pulling-it
-together-medicare-medicaid-and-the/.
221. Id.
222. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., Medicare Benefits and Transgender People
(Aug. 2011), http://transequality.org/Resources/MedicareBenefitsAndTransPeople_Aug
2011_FINAL.pdf.
223. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1060(a)(1) (2013).
224. National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Transsexual Surgery (140.3), CTR.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/medicare
-coverage-database/details/ncd-details.aspx?NCDId=83&ncdver=1&bc=AgAAQAAAAAAA&
(“Transsexual surgery for sex reassignment of transsexuals is controversial. Because of
the lack of well controlled, long term studies of the safety and effectiveness of the sur-
gical procedures and attendant therapies for transsexualism, the treatment is considered
experimental. Moreover, there is a high rate of serious complications for these surgical
procedures. For these reasons, transsexual surgery is not covered.” ).
225. Id.
226. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 222.
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C. Civilian Health and Medical Program for Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS)
The last form of health insurance provided by the federal gov-
ernment provides coverage for those in the armed forces, veterans,
and their families. The Civilian Health and Medical Program for
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) “is a program of medical benefits”
and is delivered through the TRICARE managed health care pro-
gram.227 CHAMPUS services cover active duty members, dependents
of active duty members, survivors of active duty members, and re-
tired members of the armed services.228 Beneficiaries covered un-
der CHAMPUS have three plans from which they may choose to
enroll: TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Extra, and TRICARE Standard
(CHAMPUS).229 Yet, the programs contain explicit and implicit ex-
clusions of SRS coverage, despite medical necessity.230
Transsexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria.
All services and supplies directly or indirectly related to trans-
sexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria are ex-
cluded under CHAMPUS. This exclusion includes, but it not
limited to psychotherapy, prescription drugs, and intersex sur-
gery that may be provided in connection with transsexualism or
such other conditions as gender dysporia. There is only one very
limited exception to this general exclusion, that is, notwithstand-
ing the definition of congenital anomaly, CHAMPUS benefits may
be extended for surgery and related medically necessary services
performed to correct sex gender confusion (that is, ambiguous
genitalia) which has been documented to be present at birth.231
The regulation further excludes coverage of any “[c]osmetic, recon-
structive, or plastic surgical procedures that are justified primarily
227. 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.1(d), (r) (2013).
228. 32 C.F.R. § 199.17(c) (2013).
229. 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.17 (d)–(f) (2013). TRICARE Prime acts like an health mainte-
nance organization (HMO). 32 C.F.R. § 199.17(a)(6)(ii)(A) (2013). Beneficiaries may re-
ceive care at military treatment facilities and designated civilian network providers. 32
C.F.R. § 199.17(a)(6)(iii) (2013). TRICARE Extra beneficiaries subscribe to a system that
acts like a preferred provider organization (PPO), in that beneficiaries may utilize the
providers outlined in TRICARE Prime coverage, or out of network providers at a reduced
out of pocket rate. 32 C.F.R. § 199.17(a)(6)(ii)(B) (2013). TRICARE Standard allows access
to any civilian facility for covered medically necessary treatment. 32 C.F.R. § 199.17(a)(6)
(ii)(C) (2013).
230. 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (2013).
231. 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e)(5)(ii)(7) (2013).
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on the basis of a psychological or psychiatric need.” 232 CHAMPUS
regulations prohibit any treatment for GID including SRS despite
any determination of medical necessity.233
The statutes and regulations controlling federal entitlement
programs have in some way or another limited the medically neces-
sary benefits for which a transgendered person may receive compen-
sation.234 Medicaid coverage of SRS is essentially prohibited by state
statute and regulations,235 the only exception being California.236 Medi-
care prohibits any funding for SRS for elderly or disabled beneficia-
ries.237 CHAMPUS, the health care program for the military, veterans
and their families, also prohibits SRS repeatedly within its regula-
tions.238 In conjunction with the recent ruling in the Kosilek case, a
dichotomy emerges. The government must provide medically neces-
sary SRS for convicted inmates with GID, and yet those with GID
who are reliant upon the government for medical care funding out-
side the prison system cannot receive SRS despite acting in a law-
abiding manner.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DISCREPANCY
CREATED BY KOSILEK DECISION
The great leeway federal statutes have granted in regulating
what is and is not covered under federal health care programs239 has
led to a situation in which the discrepancy that has resulted from
232. 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e)(8)(iv)(B) (2013). See also 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.4(8)(iv)(P)–(R) (2013)
(prohibiting procedures with specif ic reference to gender dysphoria), 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(g)
(29) (2012) (excluding services and supplies related to transsexualism or gender dysphoria).
233. 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.4(a)(7)–(8) (2013).
234. See supra Part V.C.
235. See supra Part V.A.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 213–19.
237. See National Center for Transgender Equality, supra note 222.
238. See supra Part V.C.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2013) (requiring regulations to establish “reasonable
standards” in determining “the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are
consistent with the objectives of [Medicaid] . . .” ); 5 U.S.C.A. § 301 (2013) (“The head of
an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the gov-
ernment of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance
of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public.” ); 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 (2013) (“The Commissioner of
Social Security shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and
to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are
necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and
proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the
proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to estab-
lish the right to benefits hereunder.” ).
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the Kosilek case can only be resolved through a constitutional chal-
lenge of the denial of SRS or legislative action explicitly providing
for coverage of SRS.
Unfortunately, current constitutional jurisprudence provides no
avenue with which to bring a successful challenge to the SRS denial.
Neither equal protection challenge nor substantive due process claim
could support covering SRS under these health care programs.
A. Equal Protection Challenge
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution provides that, “[n]or shall any state . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 240 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to limit discrimi-
nation among similarly situated individuals.241 If the classification
made by the state actor is suspect, the analysis requires a height-
ened level of scrutiny.242 Within these limits, the government may
make benign classifications as long as the state can provide a rea-
sonable basis for making such distinctions.243 The threshold for what
is rational is very low and easily satisfied.244
In this instance, the Eighth Amendment requires SRS for pris-
oners that have a medical necessity for the treatment, whereas those
with a medical need for SRS that rely on federal health insurance
programs cannot get coverage for the treatment under their plans.245
A strained argument exists that prisoners with medical need for
SRS and federal health insurance program beneficiaries with a med-
ical need for SRS are similarly situated. Both groups rely upon the
federal government to pay for their health care and treatment. Pris-
oners cannot obtain health care through means outside of the prison
system.246 Similarly, payment for health care, including sex reas-
signment surgery, is prohibitively expensive without health insurance
coverage. Without some sort of managed care insurance program,
most Americans cannot afford the high cost. Though many have the
ability to obtain reasonable health insurance through private insur-
ance companies, those that turn to the government for coverage do so
240. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection has also been read into the Fifth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
241. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
242. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
243. E.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425–26.
244. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 486–90 (1955).
245. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
246. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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because, in many cases, they cannot afford the private insurance.247
This dependence upon the government for payment of medically
necessary treatment establishes a similar situation in which the two
groups can be compared in an equal protection analysis.
The classification made by the Kosilek case does not create a
discrepancy based on a suspect class. In this case, the distinction be-
tween the two groups is that one group of those in need of SRS are
in prison, the other group is not. The Supreme Court has never held
that the non-imprisoned are a suspect class.248 Facing rational basis
review, a rational reason for this distinction must exist.249 Here, the
government can reduce costs by limiting surgical procedures covered
by the statute. Prohibiting sex reassignment surgery has a rational
relation to the goal of cost curbing and, therefore, survives this test.250
B. Fundamental Right
For either an equal protection challenge or a substantive due
process challenge, if a fundamental right is at issue, courts apply
heightened scrutiny to determine if the governmental action at issue
is constitutional.251 To demonstrate that a right is fundamental, the
right must be “deeply rooted” in the history and tradition of the
United States and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 252 The
247. To qualify for Medicaid coverage, one must be medically or f inancially needy such
that private insurance is unaffordable. Medicaid by Population, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By
-Population/By-Population.html ( last visited Mar. 30, 2014). Under private insurance,
beneficiaries of Medicaid would face extremely high premiums due to the high cost of
care for the disabled and elderly. Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid, CTR. ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES (May 8, 2013), http://www.cbp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id
=2223. CHAMPUS provides insurance to its service member employees and their families.
See discussion supra Part V.C. In many instances, the fact that the United States uses an
employer provider service for health insurance provides a much more affordable option
for armed service members to obtain health care than in the private market. See supra
text accompanying note 218.
248. Classes deserving of heightened scrutiny have been established as race, national
origin, and alienage. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recognizing
race as a suspect class); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (recognizing
national origin as a suspect class). Gender has also received intermediate scrutiny as a
quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–200 (1976) (using height-
ened scrutiny for gender classif ications).
249. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
250. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S.Ct. 2073, 2081 (2012) (f inding that
administrative considerations can provide a rational basis for tax related distinction);
Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1937) (f inding administrative
convenience and expense to be a rational basis for a tax exemption).
251. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
76 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
252. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
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interest must also be termed by a “careful description” of the right.253
How one defines the right, in many instances, can make the differ-
ence between a fundamental interest and a non-fundamental inter-
est in the eyes of the court.254 Even a broad definition to establish
a right to SRS coverage under federal health care programs would
fail this test. Medically necessary SRS coverage would be included
within a right to medically necessary health care.255 This is arguably
a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” 256
Yet, this broad definition would still fail a fundamental liberty test.
A right to medically necessary health care cannot be considered
a fundamental right, because it is not a right “deeply rooted” in the
history and tradition of the United States.257 Health insurance
emerged in the 1920s with the development of Blue Cross.258 Pa-
tients would pay the hospital a low premium in exchange for medical
treatment from the hospital.259 Following World War II, employers
purchased insurance plans as a way to attract employees.260 This
eventually developed into the employer-based insurance system that
covers most of citizens of the United States.261
The federal government did not get involved in the provision of
health insurance for citizens until the 1960s.262 In 1965 Congress
passed an amendment to the Social Security Act that established
Medicare to provide health care for the elderly.263 Congress enacted
Medicaid to create a state-federal partnership in providing health in-
surance for the medically needy and indigent of the United States.264
Medicaid allowed for state discretion in determining what is and is
not covered as long as the regulations were reasonable and consis-
tent with the objectives of Medicaid.265 Medicare originally only pro-
vided coverage for inpatient hospital costs and specified outpa-
tient services.266 In 1980, the Supreme Court upheld a Constitutional
253. Id. at 721.
254. See id. at 726–28.
255. See, e.g., DentedBlue, Why Sex Change Surgery Is Medically Necessary, Revisited,
DAILY KOS (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:42 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/03/07/1072072
/-Why-Sex-Change-Surgery-is-Medically-Necessary-Revisited#.
256. Id. at 721.
257. See, e.g., id. at 720–21.
258. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for
a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2005).
259. See id. at 8.
260. Id. at 10.
261. Id. at 5, 13.
262. See id. at 13.
263. Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
264. Id.
265. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West 2013). See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444
(1977).
266. Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
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prohibition on federal funding of abortion.267 The history of the
United States health care system points to a more limited coverage
of specific and especially controversial procedures under federal
health care programs.268
The federal government has also only covered specific groups of
people under its health care programs.269 In 2010, the United States
established a plan that expanded government coverage of health
care beyond the specified groups to include those without employer-
based insurance.270 Even then, these exchanges do not contain federal
insurance programs. They simply provide federally approved private
plans.271 The government has never provided health care in such a
way that a right to medically necessary treatment could be estab-
lished as rooted in the history and traditions of the United States.272
Additionally, the Supreme Court stated that affirmative actions
by the government are not protected as fundamental rights under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.273
The Constitution only provides protection from “unwarranted gov-
ernmental interference.” 274 The Court has addressed an analogous
situation in which a government-funded health insurance program
refused funding for a controversial medical procedure despite its
medical necessity.275 In Harris v. McRae, the Court addressed the
Hyde Amendment to the appropriations bill for the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare that prohibited federal funding for
abortions “except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term.” 276 Similar to the SRS restrictions,
Medicaid would not fund medically necessary abortion procedures un-
less they threatened the life of the mother.277 The Court responded
that the Constitution does not require the government to subsidize
all medically necessary abortions.278 Congress chose to subsidize the
267. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980).
268. Id. at 316–18.
269. These programs and groups include: Medicare coverage of the elderly and disabled;
Medicaid coverage of the poor; and CHAMPUS coverage for members and veterans of the
armed services and their families. See discussion supra Part V.
270. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2013).
271. Id.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 257–68.
273. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980).
274. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317.
275. Id. at 316.
276. Id. at 303. The amendment also provided an exception for medical procedures for
rape and incest victims if the incident was reported to a law enforcement agency or pub-
lic health service. Id. See also Pub. L. No. 96-123 § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
277. Pub. L. No. 96-123 § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
278. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
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health care of certain medically necessary procedures, but has no
positive constitutional obligation to subsidize the health care of all
medically necessary procedures, even if the funds might be neces-
sary to enjoy a constitutionally protected freedom.279 Unlike abor-
tion, no fundamental right specifically exists to receive SRS.280 This
means that the argument that Congress has an affirmative duty to
provide funding for SRS is even weaker than the argument that the
Supreme Court rejected in Harris v. McRae.281
No fundamental right to medically necessary treatment exists,
so any challenge to the prohibitions of funding for medically neces-
sary SRS procedures would face rational basis review.282 As stated
above, cost control satisfied the rational basis test. Any substantive
due process or equal protection challenge to the discrepancy estab-
lished through the Kosilek decision would not solve the inequality.283
CONCLUSION
The Kosilek decision left a remarkable impact on the jurispru-
dence concerning transgendered inmates. If sex reassignment sur-
gery is medically necessary for a transgendered prisoner, and the
request for treatment is denied, the Eighth Amendment is likely
violated.284 The impact of the Kosilek decision, however, brings to
light an inequality in the United States health care system. Though
prisoners with a medical need for SRS have a right to receive this
treatment, those outside the prison system that rely on the govern-
ment for health care cannot receive the same treatment. Unfortu-
nately, neither due process, nor equal protection challenges to this
inequality will correct the injustice. The political system remains as
the only apparatus available to alleviate this inequality. Congress,
state legislatures, and federal and state agencies must act to correct
the inherent problem that has emerged from the Kosilek decision.
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280. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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